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It is well-known in the IO literature that incumbent firms may 
want to deter entry by behaving as if they are efficient. In this paper we show 
that incumbents may sometimes prefer to encourage entry by mimicking the 
behaviour of a less efficient firm for the following reason. 
If the incumbent cannot deter potential efficient entrants, he may want to 
elicit entry by an inefficient firm who would not enter if he knows that the 
incumbent is efficient. The presence of the additional firm in the market prevents 
further entry. The incumbent then faces a less efficient competitor in the long 
run. 
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It is well-known in the IO literature that incumbent ￿rms may prefer to engage
in costly activities to deter entry. Such activities include signals of e¢ ciency,
overinvestment in capacity or process innovation (marginal cost reduction) or
more central (competitive) location choices. Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and
Kreps and Wilson (1982) were the ￿rst to show that if the incumbent￿ s cost
is not observed by the entrant, an ine¢ cient incumbent may discourage entry
by mimicking an e¢ cient one. Suppose that entry is pro￿table only if the
incumbent is ine¢ cient. In that case, a pooling equilibrium is possible in which
both the e¢ cient and ine¢ cient incumbent set the same price corresponding
to the pro￿t-maximizing price of a low-cost incumbent. The pre-entry price
does not carry any information on the post-entry pro￿ts of the entrant and
thus the entrant takes its entry decision on the basis of its prior beliefs on the
probability of entry. This argument has been developed later on to incorporate
other signals of strength, such as predatory pricing (LeBlanc, 1992; and Milgrom
and Roberts, 1982) and advertising (Bagwell, 2007; and Bagwell and Ramey,
1988).
In this paper we show that in some cases the incumbent may ￿nd it pro￿table
to do the opposite, namely to signal high-cost to encourage entry. Thus, instead
of signalling strength, the incumbent signals weakness. The rationale is that the
entry of one ￿rm may deter the entry of another ￿rm because of the increased
level of competition. By encouraging an ine¢ cient ￿rm to enter, the incumbent
￿rm faces higher costs in the short run (consisting of the costs of the inducement
and that of earlier competition), but in the long run his pro￿ts are higher due to
less e¢ cient rivals and thus less ￿erce competition. In this sense, the incumbent
￿rm does not actually try to promote entry, but rather he attempts to select
entry.
Choosing one￿ s competitors has already received some attention in the liter-
ature, but we have not come across a paper that would use a signalling mecha-
nism for this purpose. Ashiya (2000) studies a model with spatial di⁄erentiation
where the incumbent o⁄ering multiple varieties faces two potential entrants, an
e¢ cient and an ine¢ cient one. When an ine¢ cient entrant turns up earlier, the
incumbent can invite its entry by restricting the number its varieties. The entry
of a weak entrant ￿ ￿lls up￿the product space and makes future entry unprof-
itable. By inviting a weak competitor rather than introducing more product
varieties, the incumbent solves a commitment problem inherent to spatial entry
deterrence: after entry, the incumbent would have an incentive to withdraw
additional varieties which would undermine the whole entry-deterring strategy.
Rockett (1990) shows that a patent holder may want to give a license to a
less e¢ cient ￿rm in order to prevent a more e¢ cient ￿rm from becoming its
competitor when the patent expires. Creane and Konishi (2009) show that the
incumbent can reduce the number of competitors by making some of them more
e¢ cient via technology transfer. The incumbent selects a competitor that is ef-
￿cient enough to induce exit of other competitors, but not e¢ cient enough to
reduce the incumbent￿ s pro￿ts too much. Ideas related to entry selection have
1been explored by Had￿eld (1991) and Crampes and Hollander (1993). Had-
￿eld (1991) shows that an incumbent may use franchising to pre-empt future
entry. It prefers franchisees to independent competitors because it has more
in￿ uence on their retail price and can capture a part of their pro￿ts. Crampes
and Hollander (1993) show that an incumbent may apply ￿ umbrella pricing￿ , i.e.
choose an above-monopoly price in order to increase the status-quo pro￿ts of
a competitor, in order to discourage it from developing a superior technology.
For the same reason, a ￿rm might want to license its technology to a competitor
(Gallini, 1984).
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we develop a signalling model
in which entrants are uncertain about the e¢ ciency of the incumbent. We ￿nd
conditions under which an e¢ cient incumbent prefers to attempt entry selection
by mimicking an ine¢ cient incumbent in Section 3. In Section 4 we carry out
some comparative statics and welfare analysis. In Section 5 we summarize our
￿ndings and discuss some ideas for further research.
2 The model
In this section we consider an in￿nitely repeated entry model with imperfect
information. Firms maximize the expected net present value of their life-time
pro￿ts. Each ￿rm k may be one of two types ik, namely ine¢ cient (ik = H) with
high production costs and e¢ cient (ik = L) with low production costs. Initially,
at period t = 1, there is one ￿rm, Firm 1, acting as a monopolist in the market
and choosing its quantity. At the start of each period t > 1 a potential market
entrant k ￿ 2 arrives, labelled by its period of arrival. The potential entrant
decides whether to enter incurring a sunk cost E; or stay out of the market in
which case his pro￿ts are normalized to zero. Then, the incumbents and the
new entrant, compete by choosing quantities. We assume no ￿xed costs1. We
will call the incumbent and any ￿rms which entered the active ￿rms.
At the beginning of period 1, each ￿rm knows only its own cost level but
not that of other ￿rms. We assume that Firm 1 is e¢ cient with probability ￿.
For a potential entrant this probability is ￿. The prior beliefs of the ￿rms about
the cost levels of the other ￿rms correspond to these probabilities. After the
market entry stage, the type of each active ￿rm becomes common knowledge
to all active ￿rms. Apart from their di⁄erent cost levels and their periods of
arrival, the ￿rms are homogeneous.
The model described above de￿nes a repeated game with imperfect informa-
tion. Let the history of the game at time t be denoted by ht; where the history
includes for each previous period (￿ < t) the entry decision in that period as
well as the quantities selected by the then active ￿rms. Let he
t be the same as
ht except that it includes the entry decision at time t as well. The strategy of
any ￿rm k at any time t consists of
1Consequently no ￿rm ever wants to exit the market once it has entered. Thus we can
leave exit considerations out of the model.
2￿ his entry decision Dk (ht) 2 fEnter, Stay Outg; if k = t > 1 for each
history ht of the game, and
￿ his quantity qk
t (ik;he
t) 2 R+; for each period t ￿ 1 and each game history
he
t:
The pro￿ts which active ￿rms earn in a period is determined by their chosen
quantities in that period.
We describe a Bayesian Perfect Nash equilibrium of this game. At each point
in time, ￿rms maximize the net present value of their expected life-time pro￿ts
with respect to their strategies taken the strategies of the other ￿rms as given
and discounting future pro￿ts at the rate ￿; ￿ 2 (0;1). Moreover, the ￿rms
update their beliefs about the types of the other ￿rms according to Bayes rule,
where in equilibrium beliefs are consistent with the strategies of the ￿rms.
The above model builds on the seminal limit pricing model by Milgrom and
Roberts (1982) to allow for an analysis of entry selection. The main di⁄erences
with the original model are that ￿rst, in the current model there are not just
one, but many potential entrants; second, ￿rms face an in￿nite time horizon.
The ￿rst modi￿cation needs no further motivation, because it is crucial to model
entry selection. The second modi￿cation guarantees that every entrant faces the
same time horizon to pay o⁄ his entry costs.
The following notation will be used in the analysis. The set of active ￿rms
in the market at time t after the entry decision is made is denoted by
Nt = fk 2 N : k is active at time t; after ￿rm t has made its entry decisiong:
Consider some ￿rm k 2 Nt; then his competitors can be labeled by 1;:::;jNtj￿1:2
Let j‘ denote the type of competitor ‘; ‘ = 1;:::;jNtj￿1: Let qij1:::jjNtj￿1 be the
equilibrium quantity of a type i ￿rm in a one-stage oligopolistic market game,
given its competitors of type j1;:::;jjNtj￿1. The corresponding pro￿ts of the ￿rm
shall be denoted by ￿ij1:::jjNtj￿1. Thus, qHL denotes the quantity of an ine¢ cient
￿rm when its only competitor is e¢ cient, and qHLL the triopoly quantity of an
ine¢ cient ￿rm that competes with two e¢ cient ￿rms. Further, let qLasH and
￿LasH denote stage-game monopoly quantities and pro￿ts of an e¢ cient ￿rm
who sets a quantity that would be chosen by an ine¢ cient monopolist. We
make the following assumptions regarding pro￿ts: ￿iL < ￿iH, ￿ij1 > ￿ij1j2,
￿Lj1::jn > ￿Hj1::jn, ￿LL > ￿HH, and ￿LasH < ￿L. Finally, the assumption of no
￿xed costs implies ￿ij1:::jjNtj￿1 ￿ 0. All of these assumptions are quite intuitive
and for instance satis￿ed in a one-stage Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous
products or a Bertrand oligopoly with symmetrically di⁄erentiated products.
Since we are interested in the possibility of entry selection, we focus solely
on pooling equilibria, where an e¢ cient incumbent mimics an ine¢ cient one,
thereby introducing a positive probability of ine¢ cient entry which then blocks
e¢ cient entry.
2By symmetry between ￿rms of the same type, the order is not relevant for our purposes.
33 Pooling equilibrium
The pooling equilibrium we investigate has the following structure. In period
t = 1, an e¢ cient incumbent mimics an ine¢ cient ￿rm, after which at the
beginning of period 2, the ￿rst arriving entrant enters the market regardless of
its type. The reason is that the probability that the incumbent is ine¢ cient is
high enough so that the expected future pro￿ts of even an ine¢ cient entrant are
higher than entry costs. This is then su¢ cient to block entry of all subsequently
arriving ￿rms. From period 2 onwards, ￿rms set quantities that maximize their
pro￿ts in a one-stage market game. For such a pooling equilibrium to exist, a
number of conditions has to be satis￿ed. The necessary and su¢ cient conditions
are the market entry constraints of a ￿rst ine¢ cient entrant, the non-entry
constraint of an e¢ cient second entrant, the incentive-compatibility constraint of
an e¢ cient incumbent to mimic an ine¢ cient ￿rm and an incentive compatibility
condition for an ine¢ cient incumbent not to mimic an e¢ cient ￿rm. We discuss
these conditions in turn. After that we present the proposition showing the
existence of the entry selection equilibrium
3.1 Ine¢ cient ￿rst entrant
Since entry selection relies on attracting ine¢ cient entry, an ine¢ cient entrant
should prefer to enter if he has no additional information on the incumbent￿ s
type. That means that the probability that the incumbent is ine¢ cient must be
su¢ ciently high. On the other hand, he should prefer to stay out if he believes
that the incumbent is e¢ cient.
We ￿rst formalize the ￿rst condition. Without additional information on
the incumbent￿ s type and without subsequent entry by another entrant, the per
period pro￿ts of an ine¢ cient Firm 2 are ￿￿HL + (1 ￿ ￿)￿HH. The present
value of these future pro￿ts has to outweigh the costs of entry. So, the market
entry constraint is
￿￿HL + (1 ￿ ￿)￿HH
1 ￿ ￿
￿ E: (1)
The second condition requires that entering the market with a known e¢ cient




Since ￿HH > ￿HL there exist such parameter values that both conditions are
satis￿ed.
3.2 E¢ cient second entrant
In the considered pooling equilibrium, an e¢ cient entrant enters if and only if he
faces a single incumbent. Recall that ￿LH > ￿LL > ￿HH: Hence, if an ine¢ cient
￿rm is willing to enter if he observes a single ine¢ cient ￿rm (Condition (1)), an
4e¢ cient ￿rm would always enter if he observes a single incumbent, regardless
of the incumbent￿ s type. On the other hand, an e¢ cient ￿rm should not be
willing to enter if there are multiple incumbents. The highest present value of a
potential e¢ cient entrant￿ s pro￿ts amounts to ￿LHH=(1￿￿). He will not enter
if this amount is lower than the entry costs E. Thus, the non-entry constraint




3.3 The e¢ cient incumbent
An e¢ cient incumbent should prefer to copy the quantity of an ine¢ cient in-
cumbent rather than to maximize short-run monopoly pro￿ts. Suppose that an
e¢ cient Firm 1 chooses not to reveal his low costs. Then, entry takes place in
the second period and the expected total discounted pro￿ts are
￿
mimicking
I = ￿LasH +
￿
1 ￿ ￿
(￿￿LL + (1 ￿ ￿)￿LH):
Suppose now that Firm 1 acts according to its type, choosing the price of a
low-cost monopoly. Then, in each period t > 1, e¢ cient entry takes place with
probability ￿, in which case the incumbent earns ￿LL forever. With probability
1 ￿ ￿ no entry takes place, because Condition (2) ensures that an ine¢ cient
entrant prefers to stay out if he believes that the incumbent is e¢ cient. Let V M
denote the net present value of being a monopolist at the beginning of a period.
Then, the incumbent￿ s total discounted pro￿ts at t = 1 are:
￿
revealing












1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
+
￿￿￿LL






I and rearranging terms we get the fol-
lowing incentive compatibility constraint of the incumbent:
(￿L ￿ ￿LasH)+
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
(￿L ￿ ￿LH) ￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿
2
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
(￿LH ￿ ￿LL):
(4)
This condition can be interpreted in terms of three e⁄ects of mimicking on
Firm 1￿ s pro￿ts. First, mimicking an ine¢ cient entrant leads to an immediate
direct loss in pro￿ts equal to ￿L ￿￿LasH. Second, it it may lead to entry of an
ine¢ cient entrant and loss of monopoly pro￿ts equal to ￿L￿￿LH. This negative
e⁄ect can occur from the second period onwards (hence the ￿) and occurs with
probability (1 ￿ ￿). The e⁄ective discount factor of this loss is ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) namely
5the basic discount factor times remaining a monopolist for another round if he
reveals his type.
The bene￿t of mimicry is that the long-run competitor may be ine¢ cient
instead of e¢ cient, which increases pro￿ts from ￿LL to ￿LH. The e⁄ective dis-
count factor of this positive e⁄ect can be derived as follows. The bene￿t of
mimicry starts at the earliest in the third period, namely if the ￿rst e¢ cient
potential entrant arrives then (if Firm 2 is e¢ cient, mimicry yields no bene￿ts).
The probability that the bene￿t starts in a period t > 2 is equal to ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
t￿2.
Its total discounted value is then ￿
t￿1 (￿LH ￿ ￿LL)=(1 ￿ ￿). Hence, the ex-












(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
(￿LH ￿ ￿LL):
3.4 Ine¢ cient incumbent
Another necessary condition is that an ine¢ cient Firm 1 should not want to
deviate from the quantity that maximizes his current pro￿ts in order to mimic
an e¢ cient incumbent to discourage entry. Such a deviation is certainly un-
pro￿table if even at zero signalling costs an ine¢ cient Firm 1 would not want
to be seen as e¢ cient. This is the case if the expected medium-run pro￿t gain
due to delayed entry is lower than the expected long-run loss due to a higher
probability of an e¢ cient competitor, or
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
2￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
(￿HH ￿ ￿HL) ￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
(￿H ￿ ￿HH);








Now we are ready to state a proposition on the existence of a pooling perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
3.5 Entry selection equilibrium
In this section we ￿rst construct an entry selection equilibrium in this game,
using the Conditions 1 to 5. Then we show by means of a numerical example
that this type of equilibrium exists.
6Proposition 1 Let Conditions 1 to 5 be satis￿ed. There exists a pooling perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, such that:
￿ At t = 1, q1
1(i) = qH for i = L;H
￿ At t = 2, Firm 2 enters regardless of its type. Firm 1 sets q1
2(i1;he
2) =
qi1i2 and Firm 2 sets q2
2(i2;he
2) = qi2i1.
￿ At t ￿ 3; Firm k = t stays out of the market. Firm 1 and Firm 2 set the
same quantities as in period t:
Proof. We show this by constructing such a pooling perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. First we specify the equilibrium strategies of the ￿rms. Second
we show that these strategies lead to the outcome described in the proposition.
Third, we formulate a set of beliefs. Fourth , we show that the strategies are
optimal given the strategies of the other agents and their beliefs. Together
this implies that the formulated beliefs and strategies form a pooling perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibrium.







t) = qH if jNtj = 1
q1
t(L;he
t) = qH if jNtj = 1 and q1
￿ = qH 8￿ < t
q1
t(i1;he
t) = qi1;j1;:::;jjNtj￿1 if jNtj ￿ 2




Enter if jNt￿1j = 1 and
￿
either i = L;
or i = H and q1
￿ = qH 8￿ < t
Stay out otherwise.




t) = qik;j1;::jk￿1;jk+1;:::;jjNtj￿1 if k 2 Nt
qk
t (ik;he
t) = 0 otherwise
Bullet (i) describes the quantity choice of the initial incumbent, (ii) the
entry decision of the current potential entrant and (iii) the quantity choice of
all entrants in the competition stage.
2. Now we show that this strategy pro￿le leads to the outcome as described
in the proposition. Since in period 1 jNtj = 1 by assumption, the outcome in
this period follows directly from (i) As q1
1 = qH and jN1j = 1, (ii) implies that
Firm 2 enters in period 2 no matter what its type is. This implies jNtj ￿ 2
for t ￿ 3, which in combination with (ii) means that all ￿rms with k ￿ 3 stay
out of the market. As a result, only Firms 1 and 2 are active in the market,
choosing quantities according to (i) and (iii), namely q1
t(i1;he
t) = qi1i2 and
q2
t(i1;he
t) = qi2i1 respectively for any t ￿ 2.
3. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium requires a complete set of beliefs, which
are correct in equilibrium and follow, where possible, Bayes￿rule o⁄ the equi-
librium path. In this step we formulate the beliefs. Let the current period be
t:
Firms active in the market know each other￿ s type by assumption. So their
beliefs of each other￿ s types is correct.
7We now formulate the beliefs on non-active ￿rms. Non-active ￿rm ￿; ￿ < t;
is e¢ cient with probability ￿ if jN￿￿1j ￿ 2 and with probability 0 if jN￿￿1j = 1:
This is correct since no information is gained by the entry decision if there are
already multiple active ￿rms (since both types stay out), while only an e¢ cient
would always enter if there is a single incumbent (recall that the ine¢ cient ￿rm
prefers to stay out if he believes that the incumbent is e¢ cient). Any ￿rm
which still has to make his entry decision is e¢ cient with probability ￿; as no
new information on their type is revealed.
Finally we formulate the beliefs on active ￿rms by ￿rms outside the market.
If jNt￿1j = 1, then the incumbent is believed to be e¢ cient, unless he behaved
as an ine¢ cient ￿rm for all ￿ < t: In the latter case the probability that he is
e¢ cient is believed to be ￿: This is consistent with the formulated strategies.
If jNt￿1j > 1; then active ￿rm ￿ is believed to be e¢ cient if he acts as an
e¢ cient ￿rm immediately after entry, and ine¢ cient otherwise: As all ￿rms act
according to their type when multiple ￿rms are active, these beliefs are correct.
This completes the set of beliefs.
4. Now we demonstrate the optimality of the strategies. We begin with the
entry decision, and then we consider the output decisions. For e¢ cient ￿rm t;
t ￿ 2; by Conditions (1) and (3) it is optimal to enter if and only if jNt￿1j = 1;
which is his strategy. For ine¢ cient ￿rm t ￿ 2, by Conditions (1), (2) and (3)
given their beliefs it is optimal to enter if and only if both jNt￿1j = 1 and the
incumbent acted as an ine¢ cient ￿rms at all times ￿ < t:
Suppose that there are multiple active ￿rms in the market and consider
active ￿rm k: Note that current actions do not a⁄ect future pro￿ts. This is
because: (i) the future output choices of the other ￿rms are not conditioned
upon past output choices; (ii) future entry does not take place anyhow; and
(iii) active ￿rms cannot fool each other about their type. Hence, the quantities
of the active ￿rms are optimal. Finally, for the incumbent, by Conditions (4)
and (5) it is optimal ￿regardless of his type ￿to act as an ine¢ cient ￿rm before
any entry takes place.
Hence the formulated strategies and beliefs form a Perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
Now we show by a numerical example, for which all Conditions of Proposition
1 are strictly satis￿ed, that such an entry selection equilibrium exists for a
positive range of parameters.
Proposition 2 There exists a positive range of parameter such that Conditions
1 to 5 are satis￿ed.
Proof. We prove this by a numerical example for which each condition holds
with inequality. Consider a standard Cournot stage game with the following
parameters
8inverse demand function P (Q) = 100 ￿ Q
marginal cost ine¢ cient ￿rm cH = 25
marginal cost e¢ cient ￿rm cL = 20
Probability of e¢ ciency ￿ = ￿ = 0:8
Discount factor ￿ = 0:95
Entry costs E = 11000
The reader can verify that Conditions 1 to 5 are all strictly satis￿ed for
these parameter values. We conclude the proof by observing that payo⁄s are
continuous in all of these parameters.
4 Comparitive statics and welfare analysis
Mimicking an ine¢ cient incumbent becomes more attractive when the probabil-
ity that an incumbent is ine¢ cient, 1￿￿; increases. The e⁄ects of increasing the
chance that a potential entrant is e¢ cient, ￿; is ambiguous. Suppose that ￿ = 0;
then, all entrants are ine¢ cient and there is nothing to be gained from mim-
icking. Similarly, mimicking is pointless if ￿ = 1, in which case all entrants are
e¢ cient. Intuitively, an increase in ￿ makes mimicking less costly by reducing
the expected time in which the incumbent would have been a monopolist, but
on the other hand it decreases the chance that it will be succesful in attracting
an ine¢ cient entrant. An increase in ￿ has ambiguous consequences as well. A
higher ￿ increases incentives to enter. This on the one hand makes it more likely
that mimicking will encourage ine¢ cient entry, but it can make it redundant if
an ine¢ cient ￿rm ￿nds it pro￿table to enter even if the incumbent is e¢ cient.
It makes it also less likely that an earlier ine¢ cient entry will discourage later
e¢ cient entry.
Does a large di⁄erence in e¢ ciency make mimicking more likely? To examine
this, we assume Cournot competition with linear demand and costs. Under these
conditions the bene￿ts from mimicking, ￿LH￿￿LL; increase, while on the cost
side ￿L￿￿LasH increases and ￿L￿￿LH decreases. The net e⁄ect of an increase
in e¢ ciency levels is therefore ambiguous as well.
Finally, let us examine the e⁄ect of entry selection on social welfare. Let
SWj1:::jk denote social welfare when there are k active ￿rms of types j1;:::;jk,
who all play the stage game Nash equilibrium strategy. Moreover, let SWLasH
the per-period social welfare under an e¢ cient monopolist signalling ine¢ ciency.
Denote also by SWE future expected social welfare if e¢ cient entry took place
in one of the previous periods and by SWNE social welfare if no entry took
place in any of the previous periods. Suppose that the monopolist is e¢ cient
and reveals his type. Then





9Substituting and solving for SWNE gives
SWNE =
SWL
(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
+
￿￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
SWLL:
Because in period 1 no entry has yet taken place we have SWNE = SWreveal;
where the latter denotes the total discounted expected social welfare in case of
an e¢ cient incumbent revealing his type.
Similarly, if the e¢ cient monopolist hides his type, then




￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿
SWLH
That means that the welfare e⁄ect of mimicry is equal to:
SWmimic ￿ SWreveal = SWLasH ￿ SWL ￿
(1￿￿)￿
2￿
(1￿￿)(1￿￿(1￿￿)) (SWLL ￿ SWLH)
+
￿(1￿￿)
(1￿￿(1￿￿)) (SWLH ￿ SWL):
The welfare e⁄ect of mimicry can be described in terms of three e⁄ects,
similar to those describing the incumbent￿ s incentive compatibility constraint.
First, there is a short-run welfare loss due to a higher price that the incumbent
sets in the ￿rst period to mimic an ine¢ cient ￿rm. Second, there is a long-
run expected welfare loss due to a positive probability that the entrant will be
ine¢ cient. Finally there is an e⁄ect due to the possibly earlier entry. This e⁄ect
can be positive (due to a lower price under a duopoly in the second period) or
negative (due to less e¢ cient production).
5 Discussion and conclusions
In this paper we presented a signalling model of entry selection in which an
e¢ cient incumbent pretends to be ine¢ cient in order to attract entry of an
ine¢ cient entrant and in this way prevent future entry of an e¢ cient entrant.
The idea of entry selection has earlier appeared in the literature, but using
di⁄erent mechanisms. The present model could be extended to allow for more
types of entrants. One may expect, as in the article of Creane and Konishi
(2009), that the incumbent will choose an entrant that is not too e¢ cient, but
e¢ cient enough to discourage further entrants. Given that the literature on
the topic is scarce, it may be worthwhile to explore other possible mechanisms
of attracting weak competitors who discourage further entry, for instance via
investment decisions.
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